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ABSTRACT
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 in the U.S.
expanded the capital markets so that entrepreneurs can appeal directly to
non-traditional small crowd investors for investment funds. The nal rules
and forms of the JOBS Act became e¤ective in May 16, 2016. Existing litera-
ture is thus relatively small but contains ample praises for expected positive
consequences of the new crowdfunding laws for the capital markets and for
the crowd in general but has only limited analysis on the prospect of adverse
wealth e¤ects of crowdfunding for the crowd investors. A limited number
of existing studies have highlighted the prospect of a rise in opportunity for
fraud as a consequence of information asymmetry between venture capital
seekers and crowd investors. This study establishes a new and secondary
form of adverse wealth e¤ect of crowdfunding for the crowd in a setting that
focuses on information asymmetry between non-accredited crowd investors
and accredited traditional investors. The analysis is performed within a
two-period, two-state signaling model with information asymmetry between
two groups of signal recipients.
Keywords. Entrepreneurship, equity investment, project nancing, signal-
ing, venture capital.
JEL Codes. G14, G24, G28.
I. Introduction
Crowdfunding is a practice in which start up entrepreneurs in search
of funding sources may go directly to the general public (the crowd) by
an internet platform to wholly or partly nance their projects. Although
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crowdfunding in its primitive form has been an informal practice for decades
in a number of developing countries, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
(JOBS) Act of 2012 in the U.S. removed some of the legal and protective
measures and opened the capital markets so that the entrepreneurs appeal
directly to the crowd for investment funds.1 This new opening has started
an expanding academic and professional debate on various consequences
of crowdfunding in terms of technicalities and legal implications as well
as its impact on nancial markets and wealth distribution in the society.
Recent literature on crowdfunding includes the comprehensive studies of
Gri¢ n (2013) and Agrawal, Catalini, Goldfarb (2013). A special issue of
California Management Review (2016) o¤ered several informative reviews
on history and aspects of crowdfunding as it stands now. The debates at
this point are primarily theoretical since the time has not allowed yet to
have a su¢ ciently long data in large markets to perform a reliable empirical
study of the crowdfundings long term wealth e¤ects.2
The proponents of the JOBS Act have suggested that the beneciaries of
crowdfunding include both new ventures seeking capital and the crowd with
small savings seeking investment opportunities. However, the main concern
that has been almost universally stated in the debates on crowdfunding is
related to signaling and information asymmetry suggesting that the crowd is
not as t as the traditional lenders to evaluate the true risks and prospects
of a new venture and thus may fall in the trap of false signals sent by en-
trepreneurs seeking funds or inability to assess the signals correctly. The
core concern stated in the literature is misinformation or fraud that can be
inicted on non-expert crowd by fund seekers. The opposition to the JOBS
Act has argued that the Act removed some of the core investor protection
measures that existed in the legal paradigm prior to the JOBS Act of 2012.
Groups that recorded their opposition to the JOBS Act during its hearings
1On October 30, 2015, the SEC adopted nal rules allowing Title III equity crowdfund-
ing. The nal rules and forms are e¤ective May 16, 2016, which is the earliest date small
businesses are allowed to utilize the JOBS Act provisions to raise capital. Companies are
permitted to o¤er and sell up to $50 million of securities to the general public under the
relaxed provisions of the JOBS Act. Wikipedia (2016).
2There are some pioneering and rare empirical studies on certain aspects of crowdfund-
ing. Ahlers, Cumming, Gunther, and Schweizer (2015) focused on the issue of asymmetry
of information between fund seekers and crowdfunders and o¤er some insight on the risk
related to the information that the fund seekers may provide to the crowd. The study of
Kim and Hann (2015) showed that the entrepreneurs turning to crowdfunding are typically
those who have di¢ culty secruing funding from the traditional sources. In a preliminary
empirical study of crowdfunding, Mollick (2014) provided indications on some aspects of
crowdfunding, in particular observes that the successful crowdfunded propjects typically
have narrow margin while the failing projects fail by a wide margin.
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included the AARP, the Consumer Federation of America, and the Council
of Institutional Investors.3 Such concerns are based mainly on two observa-
tions; rst, ventures seeking crowdfunding are likely to have already failed
to secure funds from the traditional funding sources and, second, the crowd
investors likely do not have the expertise to correctly assess the risks and
prospects associated with a venture seeking capital. Such concerns apply to
both "debt crowdfunding" and "equity crowdfunding".
The negative prospect of crowdfunding in terms of adverse wealth ef-
fect for the crowd as presented in the existing literature and summarized
above is focused entirely on information asymmetry between fund seekers
and crowdfunders. In the present study we establish a new and secondary
form of wealth e¤ect against the crowdfunders that has nothing to do with
information asymmetry between fund seekers and crowdfunders. One of
the two core observations in the present study is that the emergence of
crowdfunding has also brought a distinct characterization of two groups of
investors in the capital markets, namely the traditional accredited investors
who are mainly large investors such as investment banks, and the other
group consisting of the non-accredited small crowdfunding investors. An
underlying relevant observation is that a rather large portion of the starting
ventures seeking capital fail before reaching a maturity stage. In this study
we utilize the natural information parity that exists between the stated two
investor groups in a rational setting to highlight the expected or long term
redistribution of wealth against the crowd investors. The notion of investor
information parity applied in the present study is dened in section 2. The
model and its main results are presented in section 3. Some qualifying as-
pects of the results and their policy implications are discussed in the last
section.
II. Investor Information Parity
Emergence of crowdfunding has brought a distinct characterization of
two groups of investors in the capital markets, namely, traditional accred-
ited investors who are mainly large investors and investment banks, and
another group consisting of non-accredited small crowdfunding investors
(the crowd). All of the relevant investment rules and information posted
by the SEC and other governmental agencies are available to both accred-
ited traditional investors and non-accredited crowd investors. Despite the
e¤orts made by the oversight and regulatory agencies to level the partic-
ipation grounds in the expanded capital market, one can rationally argue
3Consumer Federation of America (2012). Wikipedia (2016).
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that a substantial private information parity can still naturally exist be-
tween accredited traditional investor group and non-accredited crowd in-
vestor group. By denition, non-accredited crowd investors consist of small
investors that are not as resourceful and typically have less capital and less
investing experience relative to accredited traditional investors. Accredited
traditional investors are typically in a position of having access to private
resources that allow them to have a deeper nancial and operational knowl-
edge and thus are in a position of making a better risk assessment regarding
a prospective start-up venture relative to non-accredited crowd investors.
Such private parities have important implications for risk assessment and
investment decisions. A start-up venture typically sends signals to potential
investors regarding the prospects of its management, product line, marking,
and nancial plans. The signals from the start-up fund seekers are likely
to have a more accurate and realistic interpretation when received by an
average accredited traditional investor relative to interpretation made by an
average non-accredited crowd investor. We refer to the collection of these
natural and relevant di¤erences between the stated two investor groups as
the investor information parity.
III. Wealth Redistribution E¤ect
Consider a capital market with an investor composition consisting of
an accredited traditional investor group and a non-accredited crowdfunding
investor group as dened in the last section. Both groups face investment
decision in startup ventures under a historical record indicating that many
startup ventures fail before reaching maturity. The following proposition
highlights the core argument regarding the impact of investor information
parity on the expected or long-run wealth redistribution e¤ect of funding
decisions by the two investment groups.
Proposition. Crowdfunding under investor information parity neces-
sarily leads to a redistribution of wealth against the crowd as a consequence
of long-term concentration of investment by non-accredited crowdfunders
on failing ventures and long-term concentration of investment by accredited
traditional investors on successful ventures.
Proof. The result emerges from a model of rational decision makers
in a two-period, two-state signaling context with private information parity
between two groups of signal recipients. Investors in period 1 make decision
about investing in a start-up venture based on their expectation of the value
that materializes for the venture in period 2. The value expectations in
period 1 are formed by the following process. In period 1, investors receive
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signals from the venture regarding its management, production line, mar-
keting, and other relevant operational and nancial strategies. The set of
signals about the venture may also include rm-specic or industry-specic
information posted by SEC or other public agencies. It is known by all
participants that the value of the venture in period 2 will take one of the
two possible states: High (H) or Low (L) satisfying L < H. A venture is
labeled as a high-quality successful venture if its value in period 2 is high
(H), or a low-quality failing venture if its value in period 2 is low (L). The
investor belief or value likelihood parameter () is then dened by:
 = Value likelihood = Probability assessed by an average investor in
period 1 that the ventures value in period 2 will be high (H).
The value of  for an average investor is formed by the set of signals
that the investor receives in combination with the investors own private
information, skills, and experience. The expected value of the venture in
period 2 as assessed by the investor in period 1 is then given by:
E(V ) = H + (1  )L
We now assume that the investors in period 1 are considering two al-
ternative start-up ventures denoted by S and F . The possible values for
each of the two ventures S and F in period 2 are given by HS , LS , HF ,
LF , respectively, which are common knowledge and satisfy the following
inequalities:
LS < HS (1)
LF < HF (2)
We further assume that venture S is in fact a high-quality successful venture
in the sense that its true value in period 2 will be HS , and F is in fact a
low-quality failing venture in the sense its true value in period 2 will be LF .
There are two investor groups, namely, the accredited traditional in-
vestors (t) and the non-accredited crowd investors (c). For the two investor
representatives t and c from these two investor groups , the value likelihood
regarding the two ventures S and F are dened by:
iv = Probability assessed by representative investor i in period 1 that
the value of venture v in period 2 will be high (Hv), where i is the investor
index with i = t; c, and v is the venture index with v = S; F .
In assessing interrelations among the four value likelihoods (iv), we now
employ the investor information parity between accredited traditional in-
vestors (t) and non-accredited crowd investors (c) as discussed in the last
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section. We reect this information parity by assuming that the accred-
ited traditional investor representative (t) has a more accurate assessment
of venture quality than the non-accredited crowd investor representative (c).
This parity combined with our earlier assumption that venture S is a high-
quality successful venture and venture F is low-quality failing venture lead
to the following inequality relations among the four value likelihoods dened
above:
cS < 
t
S (3)
tF < 
c
F (4)
The expected values of the high-quality successful venture S as assessed
by the two investor representatives (t; c) are given then by:
Et(VS) = 
t
SHS + (1  tS)LS (5)
Ec(VS) = 
c
SHS + (1  cS)LS (6)
It then follows from the two information parity inequalities in (3) and (1)
that the two expected values of the high-quality venture S listed above
satisfy the core inequality:
Ec(VS) < E
t(VS) (7)
Similarly, the expected values of the low-quality failing venture F as
assessed by the two investor representatives (t; c) are given by:
Et(VF ) = 
t
FHF + (1  tF )LF (8)
Ec(VF ) = 
c
FHF + (1  cF )LF (9)
It follows from the two inequalities in (2) and (4) that the two expected
values of the low-quality failing venture B as listed above satisfy the second
core inequality:
Et(VF ) < E
c(VF ) (10)
The core results are now shown by the two inequalities (7) and (10).
Inequality (7) shows that non-accredited crowd investors systematically as-
sign a smaller expected value to high-quality successful ventures than the
expected value assigned by accredited traditional investors. Further, in-
equality (10) shows that non-accredited crowd investors systematically as-
sign a larger expected value to low-quality failing ventures than the expected
value assigned by the accredited traditional investors. A summary is that,
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relative to the accredited traditional investors, the non-accredited crowd in-
vestors are rationally led to invest less in successful ventures and more in
failing ventures. The result is purely a consequence of the investor informa-
tion parity as dened in the last section and is independent of a¤ordability
on part of either of the two groups to invest in the two ventures. 
IV. Qualications and Policy Implications
Some aspects of the proposition shown in the last section can now be
elaborated on. The core results in (7) and (10) reect the expectations in
terms of long-run wealth concentrations. As such, they clearly do not im-
ply or require that every new venture invested in by non-accredited crowd
investors will be a failing venture or every new venture invested in by ac-
credited traditional investors will be a successful venture. An issue that
arises here is the possibility of long-run learning by the crowd as is the case
in the models of rational expectations so that the likelihood parities in (3)
and (4) close. There are emerging ideas in the literature that are aimed
at attaining exactly such outcomes so that non-accredited crowd investors
behave in their investment decisions in ways parallel to the skillful and
well-informed patterns applied by accredited traditional investors. Agrawal,
Catalini, Goldfarb (2013, p.21) discuss market designs such as feedback sys-
tems and use of skilled intermediaries by the crowd groups aimed at closing
the gaps in information asymmetries. However, Gri¢ n (2013, p.399) o¤ers
counter arguments stating that the "wisdom of the crowd" does not work
for equity crowdfunding. A market in which crowd investors can only safely
invest through skilled representative investment rms is not a crowdfunding
market in a full sense anymore.
On the issue of highlighting the adverse consequences of crowdfunding
for the crowd, existing literature has focused on the information asymme-
try between the fund seekers and crowd investors in forms that expose the
crowd to misinformation and fraud by fund seekers. In that regard, a task
of overseeing agencies is to nd ways to protect the crowd investors against
misinformation by certain fund seekers. The present study has highlighted
a new and secondary type of adverse consequence for the crowd emanating
from the information asymmetry between the traditional investors and the
crowd investors. The stated information parity between the two investor
groups systematically reduces the set of successful ventures for the non-
expert crowd to invest in as the expert traditional investors select the more
promising ventures for their investment. The core purpose of the JOBS
Act of 2012 as become fully e¤ective in 2016 is to democratize and expand
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the capital markets by incorporating smaller investors and thus bringing the
market setting closer to an inclusive competitive market structure. However,
as highlighted by the present study, there are possible rational outcomes in
which crowdfunding could be wealth-reducing for the crowd. If future empir-
ical studies verify emergence of such outcomes in the aggregate sense, then
the regulatory agencies may have to reinstate some or all of the restrictive
investor protection measures that existed in the legal paradigm prior to the
JOBS Act of 2012. In view of such a prospect, protecting the crowd from
crowdfunding losses could be in the best interest of fund seekers as a whole.
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